Li Xiang × Li Feng: 200 Million New Urban Residents' Consumer Awakening — Who Will "Reap" the Rewards?
Taobao, JD.com, VIP.com, Pinduoduo, and China's Real Estate Sector
In 2019, every so often, Feng would sit down for a deep conversation with Li Xiang, editor-in-chief of Dedao, and share what came out of it. Follow the Dedao app [Li Xiang's Knowledge Briefing], and subscribe to the FreeS Fund WeChat account [ID: freesvc].
Today's piece is from their second conversation, focused on new opportunities in consumer and retail. They discussed growth in the Chinese and American consumer markets. Feng noted that if not for the yuan's depreciation, China would have already surpassed the US as the world's largest consumer market in 2018.
With US-China trade tensions heating up again and trade flows under pressure, we invite you to look at their breakdown of China's retail and consumer sectors:
- From Taobao and JD.com to VIP.com and then Pinduoduo — what framework should we use to understand the evolution of consumer and retail?
- If we accept that the trade war is a long-term variable and export markets are showing early signs of trouble, what are the massive, certain opportunities in Chinese consumer retail?
- Over the next ten years, facing the consumption awakening of 200 million newly urbanized people, who can capture this new demographic dividend? And what does an effective down-market strategy actually look like?
We hope this offers some useful perspective, and welcome your thoughts.
Li Xiang Interviews Li Feng: How to Spot Opportunities in Consumer and Retail?
By Li Xiang, Editor-in-Chief, Dedao
First published in Dedao app, Li Xiang's Knowledge Briefing
Why Will China's Consumer Market Keep Growing?
Li Feng is a founding partner at FreeS Fund. He's an investor with exceptionally strong analytical thinking. We've previously covered his thinking on the 2019 macroeconomic landscape. The "Time's Friend" New Year's Eve talk has cited his views more than once.
The profession of investing has shaped Li Feng's thinking into a particular pattern: first, rapidly develop a macro-level understanding of a field from its history to the present; then, make a judgment about whether to invest in companies in that industry, and by what criteria.
Translated into terms relevant to all of us, this means assessing whether an industry has prospects and where the opportunities lie. So whether you're looking to start your own business or find a job in a growth sector, you can benefit from his insights.
This time, Li Feng wants to share his thinking on consumer and retail.
In 2018, China's total retail sales of consumer goods grew 9%, outpacing GDP growth, reaching 38.1 trillion yuan. Barring surprises, this figure would surpass the US in 2019, making China the world's largest consumer market.
Despite prominent investors and internet entrepreneurs declaring in 2017 and 2018 that opportunities in consumer internet were largely tapped out, with the future belonging to industrial internet, history shows that retail and consumer has arguably been China's most opportunity-rich sector, continuously producing star companies. From Gome, Suning, and Wumart to Alibaba, JD.com, and Pinduoduo; from Haier, Gree, and China Mengniu Dairy to Xiaomi and Haidilao.
Li Feng has long paid close attention to consumer and retail. He's invested in companies in the sector himself, such as the nut retail brand Three Squirrels. He clearly believes there are still plenty of opportunities in consumer retail. Li Feng has noted that historically, before World War I, Britain exported Lipton and certain liquor brands to the world; after World War II, America exported Walmart, KFC, and McDonald's; when Japan rose in the 1980s, it contributed Sony and Panasonic. Given China's current growth trajectory, it's easy to imagine Chinese brands claiming their place in major global consumer categories. The 2017 "Time's Friend" New Year's Eve talk cited exactly this view from Li Feng.
What framework should we use to understand the evolution of consumer and retail? How do we find opportunities in the sector? This is what Li Feng will share this time.
With 38 trillion yuan in retail sales, China is already the world's largest consumer market after the US. Even without further growth, tiny adjustments within this massive market would create enormous opportunities. And it's still growing faster than GDP.
Li Feng says three factors guarantee that China's consumer market will keep growing:
First, continued urbanization bringing more urban residents. According to National Bureau of Statistics data, by end of 2018, China's urbanization rate of permanent residents was 59.58%, with over 830 million (831.37 million) urban residents. Per the State Council's National Population Development Plan (2016–2030), by 2030 China's population will reach 1.45 billion, with the urbanization rate of permanent residents hitting 70% — about 1.015 billion people. In other words, China will add nearly 200 million urban residents over the next decade. That's nearly 200 million new urban consumers.
The second factor is rising per capita disposable income. Based on China's economic growth speed and past government economic planning, per capita disposable income roughly doubles every decade. 2020's figure would double 2010's; 2010 doubled 2000's. This pace is expected to continue. Investment banks have already issued such projections. A 2017 Morgan Stanley report projected that by 2030, per capita disposable income in China's tier-two cities would double.
The third factor is the restructuring of Chinese households' financial portfolios. After the government made clear that housing is for living in, not speculation, real estate's investment function was suppressed. The result: in household debt structures, the share of debt taken on to buy property will stop rising. This effectively frees up space in personal financial structures to shift toward other consumption.
These three factors together mean, simply put, more people with more money to spend. This is a constantly growing massive market. That's the macro-level picture.
Taobao, Pinduoduo, and China's Real Estate
Now let's look at Chinese consumer retail's development over the past decade-plus. From early Taobao, to later JD.com, VIP.com, Pinduoduo, and today's online-offline integrated new retail.
The past decade-plus of consumer retail development can be described this way: urbanization and income growth created new retail and consumer demand; the previous wave of retail and consumer players weren't prepared to meet this demand, creating a gap between demand and supply; this gap could be filled by new players using new channels, new traffic, and new business models; meanwhile, China's manufacturing sector had developed supply chain capabilities that could, on the production side, support these new players in meeting the demand gap.
Simply put, economic growth and urbanization create demand, existing consumer retail can't satisfy it, and this is when innovative models emerge. At the same time, China's foreign trade developed powerful manufacturing and supply chain capabilities domestically. Under the right conditions, these capabilities can support innovative models to develop faster.
Li Feng offers an interesting lens for observing how the supply-demand gap emerges: looking at how real estate has advanced across different city tiers.
An interesting sequence: as urbanization progressed, residential real estate began sinking to lower tiers first, then commercial real estate. Residential development meant that cities at this tier had reached a certain income and consumption level where people could afford better housing. Then commercial real estate development meant residents in these cities, after housing, began pursuing better lifestyle consumption — retail, entertainment, services, education, and so on.
Each step of commercial下沉 was led by real estate and commercial real estate, from tier-one cities to tier-two, to tier-three and four, then to county towns. Wanda's development of Wanda Plazas followed exactly this pattern. Starting from Beijing Wanda, it continuously下沉 to tier-three and four cities to develop Wanda Plazas. By 2014, Wanda had already made opening Wanda Plazas in tier-three and four cities and even county towns a goal. At the time, Wang Jianlin said: "Wanda's business model works in small towns too, we're already doing it in some county towns. Wanda Plazas come in A, B, C, D grades — eventually Wanda Plazas will enter many county towns."
Rising housing prices followed the same pattern. From Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen prices rising, to tier-two cities rising, to tier-three and four rising. Each time this happened, it meant living standards in that place had reached a point where new consumer demand was emerging.
The prosperity of real estate and commercial real estate in a city signals that residents' income levels and willingness to pay for a better life are both ready. The demand side is in place.
Then comes the supply side question. If commercial real estate companies are strong enough, they can of course bring some good supply and brands to lower-tier cities through tenant recruitment. But the problem is, often these brands simply aren't prepared to下沉 to these cities.
Real estate can go down; retail can't. Real estate going down means demand exists; retail not going down means supply can't meet demand.
At this point, the demand-supply gap emerges. This gap is the difference between local consumption levels and the goods and services local consumers can actually access. This is when innovative companies' window of opportunity and红利 appears.
This has been the pattern of Chinese consumer and retail development over the past two to three decades. Real estate and commercial real estate were first developed in tier-one cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen. The providers of goods and services for these tier-one consumers included many international brands and China's early large retail companies.
Then residential and commercial real estate development began sinking to tier-two and tier-three cities. But many brands and retailers didn't sink with them. At this stage, new business models would emerge to fill this supply-demand gap. If at this stage there were also corresponding changes on the supply chain side, making manufacturing-capable companies willing to partner with these new consumer retail companies, this opportunity would be even better.
Take China's B2C e-commerce boom, which began after 2008. Companies including JD.com and VIP.com all rose during this period. This timing coincided precisely with the moment when China's commercial real estate development started sinking to tier-two and tier-three cities. Consumer demand in these cities had already emerged, but offline retail — department stores, for instance — failed to adequately capture and satisfy it. Meanwhile, the 2008 financial crisis forced domestic factories with formidable manufacturing capabilities to pivot toward the domestic market. The emergence of a supply-demand gap, the cooperation of domestic supply chains, and the new model of internet e-commerce together created companies like VIP.com and JD.com.
Representative e-commerce companies:
- Taobao was founded in May 2003; Tmall's predecessor, Taobao Mall, launched in 2008;
- In 2007, JD.com's predecessor, Jingdong Multimedia Network, was officially renamed 360buy;
- On December 8, 2008, VIP.com went live;
- In 2010, Jumei International Holding Limited was established, focusing on cosmetics group-buying;
- In 2015, Pinduoduo was founded.
The most recent e-commerce company to capture widespread attention, Pinduoduo, offers another example. Zheng Huang, Pinduoduo's founder, once expressed a similar idea. He said that in a tier-four or tier-five city, people had become considerably wealthier and were beginning to develop demand for upgraded consumption. Yet the local abundance of goods still lagged far behind cities like Beijing and Shanghai. At the same time, China had vast numbers of factories doing OEM work for brands, with extremely strong manufacturing capabilities. "Demand is there on one end, supply is there on the other." At this juncture, 4G networks, smartphones, and logistics networks made new business models possible. In Huang's words, "It may use new methods to foster the emergence of different kinds of brands for a new era."
However, Li Feng notes that within this supply-demand gap framework for reading industry trends, there are two additional variables worth attention.
The first is that each supply-demand gap, once created, closes faster and faster. In other words, the opportunity window for new players grows increasingly short, because more and more competitors rush to seize the same opportunity.
When Taobao first emerged, its competitors were essentially just offline retailers. For many of Taobao's early users, they faced offline products that were both expensive and poor quality. When offline retail couldn't satisfy their needs, they switched to online rapidly.
For the wave of B2C e-commerce companies that rose around 2008, competitors included both other e-commerce companies and a small subset of offline retailers. These retailers, on one hand, tried to improve their own offline services; on the other, they attempted to go online — whether building their own e-commerce operations or leveraging platforms like Tmall.
Moving forward along the timeline, competition intensified further after 2015. If you were a new player, those competing with you for tier-four and tier-five city users included e-commerce companies like Taobao, Tmall, and JD.com; new retail companies combining online and offline; pure offline companies; and companies with the exact same model as yours.
Therefore, if you merely captured an opportunity to fill a supply-demand gap through traffic-side innovation, then as more and more players recognized that opportunity and piled in, your room for survival would get squeezed.
The most typical example is the earliest cohort of major merchants on Taobao. Li Feng says that if you look at the first few years of Tmall's Singles' Day, the top ten in virtually every category were internet-native brands; after 2015, in the vast majority of categories, the rankings were no longer dominated by internet brands. Traditional heavyweights like Uniqlo began making a comeback. "What happened in between was that offline retailers with supply chain and brand capabilities learned how to play the online game."
Corresponding to the present moment, Li Feng says that new players riding the current wave of traffic dividends brought by WeChat face competition from online, offline, and "online plus offline" players alike — and this window of dividend opportunity may only last one or two years. If you start counting from 2018, by 2019 it was basically gone.
The most typical representative of this wave of dividends is so-called community retail. Li Feng's view is that history has already validated that newly emerging traffic formats produce only a very small proportion of successful cases, even when they look highly successful in the short term.
The second variable in this framework is that the user demographics within each wave's supply-demand gap also differ.
The earliest users Taobao attracted were almost all young people born around 1985. This was the user group with the greatest growth potential. For the next fifteen years, they would simultaneously possess both purchasing power and consumption decision-making authority. As long as Taobao's own iteration speed could keep pace with the constantly emerging demands of these users, Taobao would have secured the user group with the highest customer lifetime value.
Later, when e-commerce companies including VIP.com and Jumei International rose to target white-collar workers in tier-three cities, they found that this user group's growth ceiling was no longer as high. She might already be a young mother, with a substantial portion of her consumption structure consumed by child-related spending.
The next wave of new players would likely face users who had only recently connected to mobile internet — middle-aged and elderly user groups in even lower-tier cities. This demographic's consumption growth potential would be smaller still.
These two variables — the increasingly short time window for supply-demand gaps, and the differing customer lifetime values brought by different user structures — both affect the value of an innovative company.
The New Framework: "Know-Obtain-Accomplish"
At the meso level, Li Feng says, the development of the consumer retail industry can all be evaluated within a single framework.
As long as a gap exists between supply and demand in this domain, opportunity exists. Specifically, when consumer demand has already emerged or been created, yet existing brand owners and retailers have failed to keep pace with supply, this gap represents opportunity for new brand owners and new retailers — as analyzed earlier.
The essence of consumer retail is using supply to satisfy demand. Li Feng breaks this process into three stages, summarized by three terms: know, obtain, and accomplish. "Know, obtain, and accomplish" constitute the meso-level framework he has constructed for understanding consumer retail.
Know encompasses media, content, and information industries related to consumption; obtain encompasses channels and brand domains, involving issues including logistics and fulfillment; accomplish refers to production and manufacturing, also involving issues such as inventory.
All opportunities in this industry emerge from the know stage — what internet professionals often call the traffic side.
In the era when television was the most powerful traffic source, China's consumer retail industry was dominated by the concept of the "bid king." The bid king referred to the advertiser who placed the highest bid in the auction for prime-time advertising slots on CCTV. Those who captured bid kings were almost exclusively consumer brands — including liquor brands, dairy beverage brands, and home appliance brands.
At that time, the know stage was relatively simple. The entry points were all major traditional media: television, radio, and newspapers. Consumers learned about brands and had their demand awakened through these traditional entry points. Then traditional channels fulfilled that demand.
After the emergence of the internet and mobile internet, content formats and the entry points for accessing content both changed. The know stage changed remarkably fast. Changes at this stage created numerous opportunities for consumer retail. Looking back, every major shift in content platforms created opportunities at the obtain stage.
For instance, when Weibo emerged as a major know platform, many consumers began learning about consumption content from internet celebrities and key opinion leaders. When this traffic combined with obtain as a channel, influencer e-commerce emerged. Then came WeChat. WeChat as a major know platform not only created e-commerce built on the WeChat platform itself, but also sparked the social commerce trend.
Next came short-video platforms like Kuaishou and Douyin.
When consumers know but cannot obtain, this indicates a mismatch between demand and supply — and this is when new consumer retail companies have their opportunity. The situation of knowing but not obtaining manifests when existing consumer retail companies cannot keep pace with market下沉. The simplest example: how to satisfy the aspiration for a better life in tier-four and tier-five cities. They already know what good consumption looks like from television and the internet, and their consumption capacity is rising, yet existing consumption channels cannot satisfy them — producing the gap between knowing and obtaining.
Blocking between internet giants for competitive purposes also creates situations of knowing but not obtaining. Consider the relationship between major traffic platforms — that is, know platforms — and major e-commerce platforms — that is, obtain platforms. The mutual blocking between WeChat and Taobao created opportunities for other obtain platforms. The most famous new platform to emerge was Pinduoduo.
Correspondingly, Taobao's strategy as a major obtain platform has been clear. It has adopted various methods to purchase traffic entry points, seeking to smooth the path from know to obtain. Alibaba invested in Weibo, Bilibili, and Xiaohongshu, and also established cooperative relationships with short-video platform Douyin.
Then, at the obtain stage, if a company can help consumers better acquire goods, it too can create its own opportunity. The most typical example is the early rise of JD.com. JD.com invested heavily in logistics, enabling speed-conscious users to obtain goods better and faster. This move created a company worth tens of billions of dollars.
Early Taobao also made considerable efforts at the obtain stage. For example, it used Alipay to address fulfillment issues. Simultaneously, Taobao leveraged third-party logistics companies to solve delivery problems.
Changes at the accomplish stage can also create opportunities. The most typical example is e-commerce company VIP.com. When the 2008 financial crisis impacted apparel brands' exports, apparel brands on the supply side found themselves with massive inventory. At this point, helping factories and brands sell this inventory at discount became an opportunity.
Another variable in this framework is consumer maturation. For example, as mentioned earlier, e-commerce companies like VIP.com and Jumei International captured supply-demand gap opportunities and built platforms spanning from know to obtain. Users' behavior on their platforms resembled many Chinese people's first trips abroad, when they loved shopping at outlet malls — using the cheapest possible prices to buy brands everyone knew. But as consumers matured, they no longer pursued buying well-known brands at the cheapest prices. They became more rational, mature consumers who, within a reasonable cost-performance range, chose products and brands they personally liked. Thus they would migrate to a better obtain platform.
In 2018, the hottest e-commerce startup was Pinduoduo. A major reason Pinduoduo became a new platform for obtaining goods was the mutual blocking between WeChat and Taobao. Thus user demand cultivated on WeChat as a know platform was satisfied by Pinduoduo. Effectively, WeChat plus Pinduoduo helped many consumers complete the journey from zero to one.
The subsequent challenge is: when these users become mature users, they will pursue better obtaining. At that point, will they move to better obtain platforms, such as Taobao or JD.com? To avoid being abandoned by users, one must push further back toward accomplish, creating higher-quality supply.
In other words, capturing opportunities in consumer retail by innovating on the traffic side — stopping at the levels of know and obtain — works for acquiring users. But once consumers complete their journey from zero to one and mature, many will shift toward pursuing better obtaining. At that point, a company must push further back toward accomplish, delivering better supply to satisfy these mature consumers. Taobao's long-touted C2B (consumer-to-business) model, connecting consumers directly to factories, represents an effort to reach this accomplish layer.
Consumer maturation is the key variable accelerating this know–obtain–accomplish progression. We can use this framework to examine some hot topics of the moment.
Take lower-tier market expansion, for instance. Li Feng says great brands will have one massive opportunity. The reason is simple: after consumers complete their zero-to-one awakening, they will inevitably pursue better obtaining. Brands with advantages at the accomplish layer, capable of delivering superior obtaining, can unlock enormous market opportunities if they successfully expand downward.
Of course, this raises a series of questions: what approach and channels to use for expansion; how to adjust products — should the same brand adopt identical product formats and pricing strategies across different city tiers?
Or consider social commerce. Social commerce brilliantly captured the opportunity at the know stage. The same question applies: after users have been educated by social commerce, they will inevitably pursue better obtaining. Can social commerce satisfy users' needs after they mature? Meanwhile, as a point of comparison: in the US, direct sales are legal and social network company Facebook is extremely powerful — so why hasn't large-scale social commerce emerged there? And to this day, the US has only a handful of well-known direct sales brands. These questions all demand answers.
How to Spot Opportunities in Consumer and Retail?
Finally, what insights does this framework offer for discovering and mining opportunities?
Li Feng's answer: if supply chain or manufacturing capabilities are in China, the category belongs to a type of consumer demand that can be rapidly activated, and you can capture distinctive traffic of the moment — then, in all likelihood, you're sitting on a major business. You need to seize the emergence of new know platforms, leverage existing accomplish platforms, and quickly provide consumers with a channel for obtaining.
It can be expressed as a formula: New Opportunity = Supply Chain + Explosive Category + New Traffic.
Take cosmetics. China's cosmetics market was approximately 361.6 billion yuan in 2017, projected to approach 500 billion yuan by 2021. E-commerce's share of cosmetics sales has risen year by year, from 2.6% in 2010 to 23.3% in 2017. That's a massive market. If you fully exploited WeChat official account traffic dividends, combined with rapidly awakening consumer demand in this category, plus the fact that 60-70% of cosmetics are indeed OEM-manufactured in China — if you were in the cosmetics business from 2017 to 2018, you would have grown rapidly.
Or take coffee. It's a fast-growing category with solvable supply chain in China; apply new traffic formats and it too can rise quickly.
In short: new traffic formats on the front end, coincidentally rapid consumer demand awakening in the category at the middle layer, and world-class Chinese supply chain at the back end — then major opportunities exist in that space.
By contrast, while convenience stores have also grown rapidly in recent years, Li Feng doesn't consider this an easy business model.
He analyzed that 7-Eleven's rise in Japan had a specific backdrop: it was born with a silver spoon. As a subsidiary of Ito-Yokado, it came into the world with supply chain advantages — over 30 ready-to-eat factories ready to develop products alongside it, and ATMs from Ito-Yokado's own bank placed in stores. Moreover, Japanese food was already highly standardized at the time, and since Japanese people mostly eat cold food, back-end supply chain could handle it. These supply chain factors are difficult to replicate in China.
Another factor: Japan's population is highly concentrated, with roughly 80% in the three major metropolitan areas. This makes high-density convenience store coverage far easier.
China's urban dispersion makes it difficult for a few large companies to achieve sufficient high-density coverage. The bigger challenge: China's food standardization is not as advanced. The back-end standardized industrial processes for Chinese food are still developing. Compounding this challenge, Chinese people want hot food, and regional variation in Chinese cuisine is enormous. Hangzhou and Chengdu consumers, for example, have vastly different food preferences. In this situation, "even with back-end industrialization, it's hard to achieve unified product supply."
Furthermore, food delivery developed in China before convenience stores could take root. Consumers can order ahead and wait for delivery to their door — they don't even need to walk downstairs to a convenience store.
In the convenience store case, Li Feng believes supply chain difficulties and other China-specific factors make it hard to become a model as successful as it was in Japan.
In sum, the combination of supply chain, new traffic, and a category that can be rapidly activated creates a consumer and retail industry windfall. However, Li Feng also warns that such companies will then face two problems — both related to how the company grows after consumers complete their zero-to-one journey.
The first problem: pricing strategy. Put bluntly, as a company, do you choose to sell expensive or cheap? The benefit of selling expensive: you can aim for premium quality and earn solid margins. The drawback: you'll hit a scale ceiling. Ultimately this becomes more like a high-margin niche brand.
The benefit of selling cheap: you can leverage China's demographic dividend and manufacturing advantages, potentially building a large company. But the drawback is greater difficulty in building a brand. The challenge you face: you educated users with high cost-performance products, but after your education, as their consumption habits mature, users won't stay at your level of cost-performance. Consumer awareness changes extremely fast. Consumer growth speed far outpaces your iteration speed.
The second problem: you must quickly find a second growth driver before the supply-demand gap closes. Otherwise, you become merely a phenomenon company that enjoyed a brief traffic dividend.
Li Feng places supply chain capability in a crucial position — that is, pushing toward better accomplish. A new consumer retail company can rise quickly because it captured new channel or traffic dividends. Wherever traffic dividends exist, some company will rise. But the window of opportunity from pure traffic dividends is growing shorter. Without building your own supply chain capabilities, you may soon find yourself abandoned by users, or at least no longer as popular as at your peak.
Early Taobao mega-sellers and later cosmetics e-commerce company Jumei International Holding Limited know this all too well. By contrast, an early offline giant like Suning, with strong supply chain capabilities, could stubbornly survive even after missing a wave of new traffic and channel dividends — until the next wave arrived, which for Suning might have been the online-offline integration trend.
The above represents investor Li Feng's cognitive insights on the consumer retail industry.
Summary
First, from a macro perspective: the nearly 200 million new urban residents to come, per capita disposable income doubling roughly every decade, plus the rising share of consumption in residents' financial structure — these factors ensure that China's consumer retail market will inevitably be a massive market.
Second, every new shift in consumer retail follows a discernible pattern. As urbanization advances, a gap emerges between supply and demand for consumption. This supply-demand gap can be filled by new players leveraging new channels, new traffic, and new models. "Uncle Feng" used the know, obtain, accomplish framework to decompose and explain this industry.
Finally, if you can satisfy three conditions — capture new traffic, have supply chain in China, and operate in a category that can be rapidly activated — then you're positioned in a major opportunity. Of course, your subsequent challenge is how to face consumers after they've completed their zero-to-one awakening. Uncle Feng's advice: go deep into the supply chain, push into the accomplish layer.
Today's Question
Consumption downgrade and lower-tier expansion represent the biggest opportunities, though they come with a series of challenges: what approach and channels to use for expansion; how to adjust products — should the same brand adopt identical product formats and pricing strategies across different city tiers?
Feel free to share your thoughts in the comments below.
(This article originally appeared on Dedao App. Welcome to share to your Moments; for reprint permission please contact Dedao App.)
Li Xiang × Li Feng: Strip Away the Emotion, What Does China Look Like in 2019?
Li Feng Column | Speculating on the Endgame of China's New Retail
Li Feng Column | The Middle Path of New Retail
Li Feng Column | The Essence of New Retail, in Just 10 Words
Li Feng Column | Fed and HKMA Rate Hikes, and the Unicorn Winter
